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Abstract
Solomonoff completed the Bayesian framework by providing a rigorous,
unique, formal, and universal choice for the model class and the prior. We dis-
cuss in breadth how and in which sense universal (non-i.i.d.) sequence predic-
tion solves various (philosophical) problems of traditional Bayesian sequence
prediction. We show that Solomonoff’s model possesses many desirable prop-
erties: Fast convergence and strong bounds, and in contrast to most classical
continuous prior densities has no zero p(oste)rior problem, i.e. can confirm uni-
versal hypotheses, is reparametrization and regrouping invariant, and avoids
the old-evidence and updating problem. It even performs well (actually bet-
ter) in non-computable environments.
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1 Introduction
Examples and goal. Given the weather in the past, what is the probability
of rain tomorrow? What is the correct answer in an IQ test asking to continue
the sequence 1,4,9,16,? Given historic stock-charts, can one predict the quotes of
tomorrow? Assuming the sun rose 5000 years every day, how likely is doomsday (that
the sun does not rise) tomorrow? These are instances of the important problem
of inductive inference or time-series forecasting or sequence prediction. Finding
prediction rules for every particular (new) problem is possible but cumbersome and
prone to disagreement or contradiction. What we are interested in is a formal general
theory for prediction.
Bayesian sequence prediction. The Bayesian framework is the most consistent
and successful framework developed thus far [Ear93]. A Bayesian considers a set
of environments=hypotheses=models M which includes the true data generating
probability distribution µ. From one’s prior belief wν in environment ν∈M and the
observed data sequence x=x1...xn, Bayes’ rule yields one’s posterior confidence in ν.
In a predictive setting, one directly determines the predictive probability of the next
symbol xn+1 without the intermediate step of identifying a (true or good or causal
or useful) model. Note that classification and regression can be regarded as special
sequence prediction problems, where the sequence x1y1...xnynxn+1 of (x,y)-pairs is
given and the class label or function value yn+1 shall be predicted.
Universal sequence prediction. The Bayesian framework leaves open how to
choose the model class M and prior wν . General guidelines are that M should be
small but large enough to contain the true environment µ, and wν should reflect one’s
prior (subjective) belief in ν or should be non-informative or neutral or objective if no
prior knowledge is available. But these are informal and ambiguous considerations
outside the formal Bayesian framework. Solomonoff’s [Sol64] rigorous, essentially
unique, formal, and universal solution to this problem is to consider a single large
universal classMU suitable for all induction problems. The corresponding universal
prior wUν is biased towards simple environments in such a way that it dominates=-
superior to all other priors. This leads to an a priori probability M(x) which is
equivalent to the probability that a universal Turing machine with random input
tape outputs x.
History and motivation. Many interesting, important, and deep results have been
proven for Solomonoff’s universal distribution M [ZL70, Sol78, LV97, Hut04]. The
motivation and goal of this paper is to provide a broad discussion of how and in which
sense universal sequence prediction solves all kinds of (philosophical) problems of
Bayesian sequence prediction, and to present some recent results. Many arguments
and ideas could be further developed. I hope that the exposition stimulates such a
future, more detailed, investigation.
Contents. In Section 2 we review the excellent predictive performance of Bayesian
sequence prediction for generic (non-i.i.d.) countable and continuous model classes.
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Section 3 critically reviews the classical principles (indifference, symmetry, minimax)
for obtaining objective priors, introduces the universal prior inspired by Occam’s ra-
zor and quantified in terms of Kolmogorov complexity. In Section 4 (for i.i.d. M)
and Section 5 (for universal MU) we show various desirable properties of the uni-
versal prior and class (non-zero p(oste)rior, confirmation of universal hypotheses,
reparametrization and regrouping invariance, no old-evidence and updating prob-
lem) in contrast to (most) classical continuous prior densities. Finally, we show that
the universal mixture performs better than classical continuous mixtures, even in
uncomputable environments. Section 6 contains critique and summary.
2 Bayesian Sequence Prediction
Notation. We use letters t,n∈IN for natural numbers, and denote the cardinality
of a set S by #S or |S|. We write X ∗ for the set of finite strings over some alphabet
X , and X∞ for the set of infinite sequences. For a string x∈X ∗ of length `(x)=n
we write x1x2...xn with xt ∈X , and further abbreviate xt:n := xtxt+1...xn−1xn and
x<n :=x1...xn−1. We assume that sequence ω=ω1:∞∈X∞ is sampled from the “true”
probability measure µ, i.e. µ(x1:n):=P[ω1:n=x1:n|µ] is the µ-probability that ω starts
with x1:n. We denote expectations w.r.t. µ by E. In particular for a function f :
X n→IR, we have E[f ]=E[f(ω1:n)]=
∑
x1:n
µ(x1:n)f(x1:n). If µ is unknown but known
to belong to a countable class of environments=models=measures M= {ν1,ν2,...},
and {Hν :ν∈M} forms a mutually exclusive and complete class of hypotheses, and
wν :=P[Hν ] is our prior belief in Hν , then ξ(x1:n) :=P[ω1:n=x1:n]=
∑
ν∈MP[ω1:n=
x1:n|Hν ]P[Hν ] must be our (prior) belief in x1:n, and wν(x1:n) :=P[Hν |ω1:n=x1:n]=
P[ω1:n=x1:n|Hν ]P[Hν ]
P[ω1:n=x1:n]
be our posterior belief in ν by Bayes’ rule. For a sequence a1,a2,...
of random variables,
∑∞
t=1E[a
2
t ]≤c<∞ implies att→∞−→0 with µ-probability 1 (w.p.1).
Convergence is rapid in the sense that the probability that a2t exceeds ε>0 at more
than c
εδ
times t is bounded by δ. We sometimes loosely call this the number of
errors.
Sequence prediction. Given a sequence x1x2...xt−1, we want to predict its likely
continuation xt. We assume that the strings which have to be continued are drawn
from a “true” probability distribution µ. The maximal prior information a prediction
algorithm can possess is the exact knowledge of µ, but often the true distribution is
unknown. Instead, prediction is based on a guess ρ of µ. While we require µ to be a
measure, we allow ρ to be a semimeasure [LV97, Hut04]:1 Formally, ρ :X ∗→ [0,1] is
a semimeasure if ρ(x)≥∑a∈Xρ(xa)∀x∈X ∗, and a (probability) measure if equality
holds and ρ()=1, where  is the empty string. ρ(x) denotes the ρ-probability that
a sequence starts with string x. Further, ρ(a|x) :=ρ(xa)/ρ(x) is the “posterior” or
“predictive” ρ-probability that the next symbol is a∈X , given sequence x∈X ∗.
Bayes mixture. We may know or assume that µ belongs to some countable class
M :={ν1,ν2,...}3µ of semimeasures. Then we can use the weighted average on M
1Readers unfamiliar or uneasy with semimeasures can without loss ignore this technicality.
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(Bayes-mixture, data evidence, marginal)
ξ(x) :=
∑
ν∈M
wν ·ν(x),
∑
ν∈M
wν ≤ 1, wν > 0. (1)
for prediction. The most important property of semimeasure ξ is its dominance
ξ(x) ≥ wνν(x) ∀x and ∀ν∈M, in particular ξ(x) ≥ wµµ(x) (2)
which is a strong form of absolute continuity.
Convergence for deterministic environments. In the predictive setting we are
not interested in identifying the true environment, but to predict the next symbol
well. Let us consider deterministic µ first. An environment is called deterministic if
µ(α1:n)=1∀n for some sequence α, and µ=0 elsewhere (off-sequence). In this case
we identify µ with α and the following holds:∑∞
t=1 |1−ξ(αt|α<t)| ≤ lnw−1α and ξ(αt:n|αt)→ 1 for n ≥ t→∞ (3)
where wα>0 is the weight of α=̂µ∈M. This shows that ξ(αt|α<t) rapidly converges
to 1 and hence also ξ(α¯t|α<t)→ 0 for α¯t 6=αt, and that ξ is also a good multi-step
lookahead predictor. Proof: ξ(α1:n)→ c > 0, since ξ(α1:n) is monotone decreasing
in n and ξ(α1:n)≥wµµ(α1:n)=wµ>0. Hence ξ(α1:n)/ξ(α1:t)→ c/c=1 for any limit
sequence t,n→∞. The bound follows from∑nt=11−ξ(xt|x<t)≤−∑nt=1lnξ(xt|x<t)=
−lnξ(x1:n) and ξ(α1:n)≥wα.
Convergence in probabilistic environments. In the general probabilistic case
we want to know how close ξt := ξ( · t|ω<t)∈ IR|X | is to the true probability µt :=
µ( · t|ω<t). One can show that∑n
t=1E[st] ≤ Dn(µ||ξ) := E[ln µ(ω1:n)ξ(ω1:n) ] ≤ lnw−1µ , (4)
where st = st(µt,ξt) can be the squared Euclidian or Hellinger or absolute or KL
distance between µt and ξt, or the squared Bayes-regret [Hut04]. The first inequality
actually holds for any two (semi)measures, and the last inequality follows from (2).
These bounds (with n=∞) imply
ξ(xt|ω<t)− µ(xt|ω<t)→ 0 for any xt rapid w.p.1 for t→∞.
One can also show multi-step lookahead convergence ξ(xt:nt|ω<t)−µ(xt:nt|ω<t)→0,
(even for unbounded horizon 1≤ nt−t+1→∞) which is interesting for delayed
sequence prediction and in reactive environments [Hut04].
Continuous environmental classes. The bounds above remain approximately
valid for most parametric model classes. Let M :={νθ : θ∈Θ⊆ IRd} be a family of
probability distributions parameterized by a d-dimensional continuous parameter θ,
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and µ≡νθ0 ∈M the true generating distribution. For a continuous weight density2
w(θ)>0 the sums (1) are naturally replaced by integrals:
ξ(x) :=
∫
Θ
w(θ)·νθ(x) dθ,
∫
Θ
w(θ) dθ = 1 (5)
The most important property of ξ was the dominance (2) achieved by dropping the
sum over ν. The analogous construction here is to restrict the integral over θ to
a small vicinity of θ0. Since a continuous parameter can typically be estimated to
accuracy ∝n−1/2 after n observations, the largest volume in which νθ as a function
of θ is approximately flat is ∝ (n−1/2)d, hence ξ(x1:n)& n−d/2w(θ0)µ(x1:n). Under
some weak regularity conditions one can prove [CB90, Hut04]
Dn(µ||ξ) := E ln µ(ω1:n)ξ(ω1:n) ≤ lnw(θ0)−1 + d2 ln n2pi + 12 ln det ¯n(θ0) + o(1) (6)
where w(θ0) is the weight density (5) of µ in ξ, and o(1) tends to zero for n→∞,
and the average Fisher information matrix ¯n(θ)=− 1nE[∇θ∇Tθ lnνθ(ω1:n)] measures
the local smoothness of νθ and is bounded for many reasonable classes, including all
stationary (kth-order) finite-state Markov processes. We see that in the continuous
case, Dn is no longer bounded by a constant, but grows very slowly (logarithmically)
with n, which still implies that ε-deviations are exponentially seldom. Hence, (6)
allows to bound (4) even in case of continuous M.
3 How to Choose the Prior
Classical principles. The probability axioms (implying Bayes’ rule) allow to com-
pute posteriors and predictive distributions from prior ones, but are mute about
how to choose the prior. Much has been written on the choice of non-informative-
=neutral=objective priors (see [KW96] for a survey and references; in Section 6
we briefly discuss how to incorporate subjective prior knowledge). For finite M,
Laplace’s symmetry or indifference argument which sets wν=
1
|M| ∀ν ∈M is a rea-
sonable principle. The analogue uniform density w(θ) = [Vol(Θ)]−1 for a compact
measurable parameter space Θ is less convincing, since w becomes non-uniform
under different parametrization (e.g. θ; θ′ :=
√
θ). Jeffreys’ solution is to find a
symmetry group of the problem (like permutations for finite M or translations for
Θ=IR) and require the prior to be invariant under group transformations. Another
solution is the minimax approach by Bernardo [CB90] which minimizes (the quite
tight) bound (6) for the worst µ∈M. Choice w(θ)∝√det¯n(θ) equalizes and hence
minimizes (6). Problems are that there may be no obvious symmetry, the resulting
prior can be improper, depend on which parameters are treated as nuisance param-
eters, on the model class, and on n. Other principles are maximum entropy and
conjugate priors. The principles above, although not unproblematic, can provide
good objective priors in many cases of small discrete or compact spaces, but we will
2w() will always denote densities, and w() probabilities.
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meet some more problems later. For “large” model classes we are interested in, i.e.
countably infinite, non-compact, or non-parametric spaces, the principles typically
do not apply or break down.
Occam’s razor et al. Machine learning, the computer science branch of statis-
tics, often deals with very large model classes. Naturally, machine learning has
(re)discovered and exploited quite different principles for choosing priors, appropri-
ate for this situation. The overarching principles put together by Solomonoff [Sol64]
are: Occam’s razor (choose the simplest model consistent with the data), Epicurus’
principle of multiple explanations (keep all explanations consistent with the data),
(Universal) Turing machines (to compute, quantify and assign codes to all quanti-
ties of interest), and Kolmogorov complexity (to define what simplicity/complexity
means).
We will first “derive” the so called universal prior, and subsequently justify it by
presenting various welcome theoretical properties and by examples. The idea is that
a priori, i.e. before seeing the data, all models are “consistent,” so a-priori Epicurus
would regard all models (inM) possible, i.e. choose wν>0 ∀ν∈M. In order to also
do (some) justice to Occam’s razor we should prefer simple hypothesis, i.e. assign
high prior/low prior wν to simple/complex hypotheses Hν . Before we can define this
prior, we need to quantify the notion of complexity.
Notation. A function f :S → IR∪{±∞} is said to be lower semi-computable (or
enumerable) if the set {(x,y) : y < f(x), x∈S, y ∈ IQ} is recursively enumerable. f
is upper semi-computable (or co-enumerable) if −f is enumerable. f is computable
(or recursive) if f and −f are enumerable. The set of (co)enumerable functions
is recursively enumerable. We write O(1) for a constant of reasonable size: 100
is reasonable, maybe even 230, but 2500 is not. We write f(x)
+≤ g(x) for f(x)≤
g(x)+O(1) and f(x)
×≤ g(x) for f(x)≤ 2O(1) ·g(x). Corresponding equalities hold if
the inequalities hold in both directions.3 We say that a property A(n)∈{true,false}
holds for most n, if #{t≤n :A(t)}/nn→∞−→1.
Kolmogorov complexity. We can now quantify the complexity of a string. Intu-
itively, a string is simple if it can be described in a few words, like “the string of one
million ones”, and is complex if there is no such short description, like for a random
object whose shortest description is specifying it bit by bit. We are interested in
effective descriptions, and hence restrict decoders to be Turing machines (TMs).
Let us choose some universal (so-called prefix) Turing machine U with binary in-
put=program tape, Xary output tape, and bidirectional work tape. We can then
define the prefix Kolmogorov complexity [LV97] of string x as the length ` of the
shortest binary program p for which U outputs x:
K(x) := min
p
{`(p) : U(p) = x}.
For non-string objects o (like numbers and functions) we define K(o) :=K(〈o〉),
where 〈o〉∈X ∗ is some standard code for o. In particular, if (fi)∞i=1 is an enumeration
of all (co)enumerable functions, we define K(fi)=K(i).
3We will ignore this additive/multiplicative fudge in our discussion till Section 6.
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An important property of K is that it is nearly independent of the choice of U .
More precisely, if we switch from one universal TM to another, K(x) changes at
most by an additive constant independent of x. For reasonable universal TMs, the
compiler constant is of reasonable size O(1). A defining property of K :X ∗→ IN
is that it additively dominates all co-enumerable functions f :X ∗→ IN that satisfy
Kraft’s inequality
∑
x2
−f(x) ≤ 1, i.e. K(x) +≤ f(x) for K(f)=O(1). The universal
TM provides a shorter prefix code than any other effective prefix code. K shares
many properties with Shannon’s entropy (information measure) S, but K is superior
to S in many respects. To be brief, K is an excellent universal complexity measure,
suitable for quantifying Occam’s razor. We need the following properties of K:
a) K is not computable, but only upper semi-computable,
b) the upper bound K(n)
+≤ log2n+2log2logn, (7)
c) Kraft’s inequality
∑
x2
−K(x)≤1, which implies 2−K(n)≤ 1
n
for most n,
d) information non-increase K(f(x))
+≤K(x)+K(f) for recursive f :X ∗→X ∗,
e) K(x)
+≤−log2P (x)+K(P ) if P :X ∗→ [0,1] is enumerable and
∑
xP (x)≤1,
f)
∑
x:f(x)=y2
−K(x) ×=2−K(y) if f is recursive and K(f)=O(1).
Proofs of (a)−(e) can be found in [LV97], and the (easy) proof of (f) in the extended
version of this paper.
The universal prior. We can now quantify a prior biased towards simple models.
First, we quantify the complexity of an environment ν or hypothesis Hν by its
Kolmogorov complexity K(ν). The universal prior should be a decreasing function
in the model’s complexity, and of course sum to (less than) one. Since K satisfies
Kraft’s inequality (7c), this suggests the following choice:
wν = w
U
ν := 2
−K(ν) (8)
For this choice, the bound (4) on Dn reads∑∞
t=1E[st] ≤ Dn ≤ K(µ) ln 2 (9)
i.e. the number of times, ξ deviates from µ by more than ε > 0 is bounded by
O(K(µ)), i.e. is proportional to the complexity of the environment. Could other
choices for wν lead to better bounds? The answer is essentially no [Hut04]: Consider
any other reasonable prior w′ν , where reasonable means (lower semi)computable
with a program of size O(1). Then, MDL bound (7e) with P ();w′() and x; 〈µ〉
shows K(µ)
+≤−log2w′µ+K(w′()), hence lnw′µ−1
+≥K(µ)ln2 leads (within an additive
constant) to a weaker bound. A counting argument also shows that O(K(µ)) errors
for most µ are unavoidable. So this choice of prior leads to very good prediction.
Even for continuous classes M, we can assign a (proper) universal prior (not
density) wUθ = 2
−K(θ) > 0 for computable θ, and 0 for uncomputable ones. This
effectively reduces M to a discrete class {νθ∈M :wUθ >0} which is typically dense
in M. We will see that this prior has many advantages over the classical prior
densities.
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4 Independent Identically Distributed Data
Laplace’s rule for Bernoulli sequences. Let x = x1x2...xn ∈ X n = {0,1}n be
generated by a biased coin with head=1 probability θ ∈ [0,1], i.e. the likelihood
of x under hypothesis Hθ is νθ(x) = P[x|Hθ] = θn1(1−θ)n0 , where n1 = x1+ ...+
xn = n−n0. Bayes assumed a uniform prior density w(θ) = 1. The evidence is
ξ(x)=
∫ 1
0
νθ(x)w(θ) dθ=
n1!n0!
(n+1)!
and the posterior probability weight density w(θ|x)=
νθ(x)w(θ)/ξ(x)=
(n+1)!
n1!n0!
θn1(1−θ)n0 of θ after seeing x is strongly peaked around the
frequency estimate θˆ= n1
n
for large n. Laplace asked for the predictive probability
ξ(1|x) of observing xn+1=1 after having seen x=x1...xn, which is ξ(1|x)= ξ(x1)ξ(x) = n1+1n+2 .
(Laplace believed that the sun had risen for 5 000 years = 1 826 213 days since
creation, so he concluded that the probability of doom, i.e. that the sun won’t rise
tomorrow is 1
1826215
.) This looks like a reasonable estimate, since it is close to the
relative frequency, asymptotically consistent, symmetric, even defined for n=0, and
not overconfident (never assigns probability 1).
The problem of zero prior. But also Laplace’s rule is not without problems.
The appropriateness of the uniform prior has been questioned in Section 3 and will
be detailed below. Here we discuss a version of the zero prior problem. If the
prior is zero, then the posterior is necessarily also zero. The above example seems
unproblematic, since the prior and posterior densities w(θ) and w(θ|x) are non-zero.
Nevertheless it is problematic e.g. in the context of scientific confirmation theory
[Ear93].
Consider the hypothesis H that all balls in some urn, or all ravens, are black
(=1). A natural model is to assume that balls/ravens are drawn randomly from an
infinite population with fraction θ of black balls/ravens and to assume a uniform
prior over θ, i.e. just the Bayes-Laplace model. Now we draw n objects and observe
that they are all black.
We may formalize H as the hypothesis H ′ := {θ= 1}. Although the posterior
probability of the relaxed hypothesis Hε := {θ≥ 1−ε}, P[Hε|1n]=
∫ 1
1−εw(θ|1n) dθ=∫ 1
1−ε(n+1)θ
ndθ=1−(1−ε)n+1 tends to 1 for n→∞ for every fixed ε>0, P[H ′|1n]=
P[H0|1n] remains identically zero, i.e. no amount of evidence can confirm H ′. The
reason is simply that zero prior P[H ′]=0 implies zero posterior.
Note that H ′ refers to the unobservable quantity θ and only demands blackness
with probability 1. So maybe a better formalization of H is purely in terms of obser-
vational quantities: H ′′ :={ω1:∞=1∞}. Since ξ(1n)= 1n+1 , the predictive probability
of observing k further black objects is ξ(1k|1n)= ξ(1n+k)
ξ(1n)
= n+1
n+k+1
. While for fixed k
this tends to 1, P[H ′′|1n]=limk→∞ξ(1k|1n)≡0 ∀n, as for H ′.
One may speculate that the crux is the infinite population. But for a finite
population of size N and sampling with (similarly without) repetition, P[H ′′|1n]=
ξ(1N−n|1n)= n+1
N+1
is close to one only if a large fraction of objects has been observed.
This contradicts scientific practice: Although only a tiny fraction of all existing
ravens have been observed, we regard this as sufficient evidence for believing strongly
in H.
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There are two solutions of this problem: We may abandon strict/logical/all-
quantified/universal hypotheses altogether in favor of soft hypotheses like Hε. Al-
though not unreasonable, this approach is unattractive for several reasons. The other
solution is to assign a non-zero prior to θ=1. Consider, for instance, the improper
density w(θ)= 1
2
[1+δ(1−θ)], where δ is the Dirac-delta (∫ f(θ)δ(θ−a) dθ=f(a)), or
equivalently P[θ≥ a] = 1− 1
2
a. We get ξ(x1:n)=
1
2
[ n1!n0!
(n+1)!
+δ0n0 ], where δij = {1 if i=j0 else }
is Kronecker’s δ. In particular ξ(1n)= 1
2
n+2
n+1
is much larger than for uniform prior.
Since ξ(1k|1n)= n+k+2
n+k+1
· n+1
n+2
, we get P[H ′′|1n]=limk→∞ξ(1k|1n)= n+1n+2→1, i.e. H ′′ gets
strongly confirmed by observing a reasonable number of black objects. This correct
asymptotics also follows from the general result (3). Confirmation of H ′′ is also
reflected in the fact that ξ(0|1n)= 1
(n+2)2
tends much faster to zero than for uniform
prior, i.e. the confidence that the next object is black is much higher. The power
actually depends on the shape of w(θ) around θ=1. Similarly H ′ gets confirmed:
P[H ′|1n]=µ1(1n)P[θ=1]/ξ(1n)= n+1n+2→1. On the other hand, if a single (or more)
0 are observed (n0>0), then the predictive distribution ξ(·|x) and posterior w(θ|x)
are the same as for uniform prior.
The findings above remain qualitatively valid for i.i.d. processes over finite non-
binary alphabet |X |>2 and for non-uniform prior.
Surely to get a generally working setup, we should also assign a non-zero prior
to θ = 0 and to all other “special” θ, like 1
2
and 1
6
, which may naturally appear
in a hypothesis, like “is the coin or die fair”. The natural continuation of this
thought is to assign non-zero prior to all computable θ. This is another motivation
for the universal prior wUθ =2
−K(θ) (8) constructed in Section 3. It is difficult but
not impossible to operate with such a prior [PH04]. One may want to mix the
discrete prior wUν with a continuous (e.g. uniform) prior density, so that the set of
non-computable θ keeps a non-zero density. Although possible, we will see that this
is actually not necessary.
Reparametrization invariance. Naively, the uniform prior is justified by the in-
difference principle, but as discussed in Section 3, uniformity is not reparametriza-
tion invariant. For instance if in our Bernoulli example we introduce a new
parametrization θ′=
√
θ, then the θ′-density w′(θ′)=2
√
θw(θ) is no longer uniform
if w(θ)=1 is uniform.
More generally, assume we have some principle which leads to some prior w(θ).
Now we apply the principle to a different parametrization θ′∈Θ′ and get prior w′(θ′).
Assume that θ and θ′ are related via bijection θ=f(θ′). Another way to get a θ′-prior
is to transform the θ-prior w(θ);w˜(θ′). The reparametrization invariance principle
(RIP) states that w′ should be equal to w˜.
For discrete Θ, simply w˜θ′ =wf(θ′), and a uniform prior remains uniform (w
′
θ′ =
w˜θ′=wθ=
1
|Θ|) in any parametrization, i.e. the indifference principle satisfies RIP in
finite model classes.
In case of densities, we have w˜(θ′)=w(f(θ′))df(θ
′)
dθ′ , and the indifference principle
violates RIP for non-linear transformations f . But Jeffrey’s and Bernardo’s principle
satisfy RIP. For instance, in the Bernoulli case we have ¯n(θ)=
1
θ
+ 1
1−θ , hence w(θ)=
9
1
pi
[θ(1−θ)]−1/2 and w′(θ′)= 1
pi
[f(θ′)(1−f(θ′))]−1/2 df(θ′)
dθ′ = w˜(θ
′).
Does the universal prior wUθ = 2
−K(θ) satisfy RIP? If we apply the “univer-
sality principle” to a θ′-parametrization, we get w′θ′
U = 2−K(θ
′). On the other
hand, wθ simply transforms to w˜
U
θ′ = w
U
f(θ′) = 2
−K(f(θ′)) (wθ is a discrete (non-
density) prior, which is non-zero on a discrete subset of M). For computable f
we have K(f(θ′))
+≤K(θ′)+K(f) by (7d), and similarly K(f−1(θ)) +≤K(θ)+K(f)
if f is invertible. Hence for simple bijections f i.e. for K(f) = O(1), we have
K(f(θ′)) +=K(θ′), which implies w′θ′
U ×= w˜Uθ′ , i.e. the universal prior satisfies RIP w.r.t.
simple transformations f (within a multiplicative constant).
Regrouping invariance. There are important transformations f which are not
bijections, which we consider in the following. A simple non-bijection is θ=f(θ′)=
θ′2 if we consider θ′ ∈ [−1,1]. More interesting is the following example: Assume
we had decided not to record blackness versus non-blackness of objects, but their
“color”. For simplicity of exposition assume we record only whether an object is
black or white or colored, i.e. X ′ = {B,W,C}. In analogy to the binary case we
use the indifference principle to assign a uniform prior on θ′ ∈ Θ′ := ∆3, where
∆d := {θ′ ∈ [0,1]d :
∑d
i=1θ
′
i = 1}, and νθ′(x′1:n) =
∏
iθ
′
i
ni . All inferences regarding
blackness (predictive and posterior) are identical to the binomial model νθ(x1:n)=
θn1(1−θ)n0 with x′t=B ; xt=1 and x′t=W orC ; xt=0 and θ=f(θ′)= θ′B and
w(θ)=
∫
∆3
w′(θ′)δ(θ′B−θ)dθ′. Unfortunately, for uniform prior w′(θ′)∝1, w(θ)∝1−θ
is not uniform, i.e. the indifference principle is not invariant under splitting/grouping,
or general regrouping. Regrouping invariance is regarded as a very important and
desirable property [Wal96].
We now consider general i.i.d. processes νθ(x) =
∏d
i=1θ
ni
i . Dirichlet priors
w(θ)∝∏di=1θαi−1i form a natural conjugate class (w(θ|x)∝∏di=1θni+αi−1i ) and are
the default priors for multinomial (i.i.d.) processes over finite alphabet X of size
d. Note that ξ(a|x)= na+αa
n+α1+...+αd
generalizes Laplace’s rule and coincides with Car-
nap’s [Ear93] confirmation function. Symmetry demands α1= ...=αd; for instance
α≡ 1 for uniform and α≡ 1
2
for Bernard-Jeffrey’s prior. Grouping two “colors” i
and j results in a Dirichlet prior with αi&j =αi+αj for the group. The only way
to respect symmetry under all possible groupings is to set α≡0. This is Haldane’s
improper prior, which results in unacceptably overconfident predictions ξ(1|1n)=1.
Walley [Wal96] solves the problem that there is no single acceptable prior density
by considering sets of priors.
We now show that the universal prior wUθ =2
−K(θ) is invariant under regrouping,
and more generally under all simple (computable with complexity O(1)) even non-
bijective transformations. Consider prior w′θ′ . If θ= f(θ
′) then w′θ′ transforms to
w˜θ=
∑
θ′:f(θ′)=θw
′
θ′ (note that for non-bijections there is more than one w
′
θ′ consistent
with w˜θ). In θ
′-parametrization, the universal prior reads w′θ′
U = 2−K(θ
′). Using
(7f) with x= 〈θ′〉 and y= 〈θ〉 we get w˜Uθ =
∑
θ′:f(θ′)=θ2
−K(θ′) ×=2−K(θ)=wUθ , i.e. the
universal prior is general transformation and hence regrouping invariant (within a
multiplicative constant) w.r.t. simple computable transformations f .
Note that reparametrization and regrouping invariance hold for arbitrary classes
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M and are not limited to the i.i.d. case.
5 Universal Sequence Prediction
Universal choice of M. The bounds of Section 2 apply if M contains the true
environment µ. The largerM the less restrictive is this assumption. The class of all
computable distributions, although only countable, is pretty large from a practical
point of view, since it includes for instance all of today’s valid physics theories. It
is the largest class, relevant from a computational point of view. Solomonoff [Sol64,
Eq.(13)] defined and studied the mixture over this class.
One problem is that this class is not enumerable, since the class of computable
functions f :X ∗→IR is not enumerable (halting problem), nor is it decidable whether
a function is a measure. Hence ξ is completely incomputable. Levin [ZL70] had the
idea to “slightly” extend the class and include also lower semi-computable semimea-
sures. One can show that this class MU={ν1,ν2,...} is enumerable, hence
ξU(x) =
∑
ν∈MU
wUν ν(x) (10)
is itself lower semi-computable, i.e. ξU ∈MU , which is a convenient property in
itself. Note that since 1
nlog2n
×≤wUνn ≤ 1n for most n by (7b) and (7c), most νn have
prior approximately reciprocal to their index n.
In some sense MU is the largest class of environments for which ξ is in some
sense computable [Hut04], but see [Sch02] for even larger classes.
The problem of old evidence. An important problem in Bayesian inference
in general and (Bayesian) confirmation theory [Ear93] in particular is how to deal
with ‘old evidence’ or equivalently with ‘new theories’. How shall a Bayesian treat
the case when some evidence E=̂x (e.g. Mercury’s perihelion advance) is known
well-before the correct hypothesis/theory/model H=̂µ (Einstein’s general relativity
theory) is found? How shall H be added to the Bayesian machinery a posteriori?
What is the prior of H? Should it be the belief in H in a hypothetical counterfactual
world in which E is not known? Can old evidence E confirm H? After all, H could
simply be constructed/biased/fitted towards “explaining” E.
The universal class MU and universal prior wUν formally solve this problem:
The universal prior of H is 2−K(H). This is independent of M and of whether
E is known or not. If we use E to construct H or fit H to explain E, this will
lead to a theory which is more complex (K(H)
+≥K(E)) than a theory from scratch
(K(H)=O(1)), so cheats are automatically penalized. There is no problem of adding
hypotheses to M a posteriori. Priors of old hypotheses are not affected. Finally,
MU includes all hypothesis (including yet unknown or unnamed ones) a priori. So
at least theoretically, updating M is unnecessary.
Other representations of ξU . There is a much more elegant representation of
ξU : Solomonoff [Sol64, Eq.(7)] defined the universal prior M(x) as the probability
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that the output of a universal Turing machine U starts with x when provided with
fair coin flips on the input tape. Note that a uniform distribution is also used in the
so-called No-Free-Lunch theorems to prove the impossibility of universal learners,
but in our case the uniform distribution is piped through a universal Turing machine
which defeats these negative implications. Formally, M can be defined as
M(x) :=
∑
p : U(p)=x∗
2−`(p) ×= ξU(x) (11)
where the sum is over all (so-called minimal) programs p for which U outputs a
string starting with x. M may be regarded as a 2−`(p)-weighted mixture over all
computable deterministic environments νp (νp(x)=1 if U(p)=x∗ and 0 else). Now,
as a positive surprise, M(x) coincides with ξU(x) within an irrelevant multiplicative
constant. So it is actually sufficient to consider the class of deterministic semimea-
sures. The reason is that the probabilistic semimeasures are in the convex hull of
the deterministic ones, and so need not be taken extra into account in the mixture.
Bounds for computable environments. The bound (9) surely is applicable for
ξ= ξU and now holds for any computable measure µ. Within an additive constant
the bound is also valid for M ×= ξ. That is, ξU and M are excellent predictors
with the only condition that the sequence is drawn from any computable probability
distribution. Bound (9) shows that the total number of prediction errors is small.
Similarly to (3) one can show that
∑n
t=1|1−M(xt|x<t)| ≤Km(x1:n)ln2, where the
monotone complexity Km(x) := min{`(p) : U(p) = x∗} is defined as the length of
the shortest (nonhalting) program computing a string starting with x [ZL70, LV97,
Hut04].
If x1:∞ is a computable sequence, then Km(x1:∞) is finite, which implies
M(xt|x<t)→ 1 on every computable sequence. This means that if the environment
is a computable sequence (whichsoever, e.g. 1∞ or the digits of pi or e), after having
seen the first few digits, M correctly predicts the next digit with high probability,
i.e. it recognizes the structure of the sequence. In particular, observing an increas-
ing number of black balls or black ravens or sunrises, M(1|1n)→1 (Km(1∞)=O(1))
becomes rapidly confident that future balls and ravens are black and that the sun
will rise tomorrow.
Universal is better than continuous M. Although we argued that incom-
putable environments µ can safely be ignored, one may be nevertheless uneasy using
Solomonoff’s M ×= ξU (11) if outperformed by a continuous mixture ξ (5) on such
µ ∈M\MU , for instance if M would fail to predict a Bernoulli(θ) sequence for
incomputable θ. Luckily this is not the case: Although νθ() and wθ can be incom-
putable, the studied classesM themselves, i.e. the two-argument function ν()(), and
the weight function w(), and hence ξ(), are typically computable (the integral can
be approximated to arbitrary precision). Hence M(x) ×= ξU(x)≥2−K(ξ)ξ(x) by (10)
and K(ξ) is often quite small. This implies for all µ
Dn(µ||M) ≡ E[ln µ(ω1:n)M(ω1:n) ] = E[ln
µ(ω1:n)
ξ(ω1:n)
]+E[ln ξ(ω1:n)
M(ω1:n)
]
+≤ Dn(µ||ξ)+K(ξ) ln 2
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So any bound (6) for Dn(µ||ξ) is directly valid also for Dn(µ||M), save an additive
constant. That is, M is superior (or equal) to all computable mixture predictors
ξ based on any (continuous or discrete) model class M and weight w(θ), even if
environment µ is not computable. Furthermore, while for essentially all parametric
classes, Dn(µ||ξ)∼ d2 lnn grows logarithmically in n for all (incl. computable) µ∈M,
Dn(µ||M)≤K(µ)ln2 is finite for computable µ. Bernardo’s prior even implies a
bound for M that is uniform (minimax) in θ ∈ Θ. Many other priors based on
reasonable principles (see Section 3 and [KW96]) and many other computable prob-
abilistic predictors ρ are argued for. The above actually shows that M is superior
to all of them.
6 Discussion
Critique and problems. In practice we often have extra information about the
problem at hand, which could and should be used to guide the forecasting. One
way is to explicate all our prior knowledge y and place it on an extra input tape of
our universal Turing machine U , which leads to the conditional complexity K(·|y).
We now assign “subjective” prior wUν|y =2
−K(ν|y) to environment ν, which is large
for those ν that are simple (have short description) relative to our background
knowledge y. Since K(µ|y) +≤K(µ), extra knowledge never misguides (see (9)).
Alternatively we could prefix our observation sequence x by y and use M(yx) for
prediction [Hut04].
Another critique concerns the dependence of K and M on U . Predictions for
short sequences x (shorter than typical compiler lengths) can be arbitrary. But
taking into account our (whole) scientific prior knowledge y, and predicting the now
long string yx leads to good (less sensitive to “reasonable” U) predictions [Hut04].
Finally, K and M can serve as “gold standards” which practitioners should aim
at, but since they are only semi-computable, they have to be (crudely) approxi-
mated in practice. Levin complexity [LV97], Schmidhuber’s speed prior, the mini-
mal message and description length principles [Wal05], and off-the-shelf compressors
like Lempel-Ziv are such approximations, which have been successfully applied to a
plethora of problems [CV05, Sch04].
Summary. We compared traditional Bayesian sequence prediction based on con-
tinuous classes and prior densities to Solomonoff’s universal predictor M , prior wUν ,
and class MU . We discussed: Convergence for generic class and prior, the relative
entropy bound for continuous classes, indifference/symmetry principles, the problem
of zero p(oste)rior and confirmation of universal hypotheses, reparametrization and
regrouping invariance, the problem of old evidence and updating, thatM works even
in non-computable environments, how to incorporate prior knowledge, the predic-
tion of short sequences, the constant fudges in all results and the U -dependence,M ’s
incomputability and crude but practical approximations. In short, universal predic-
tion solves or avoids or meliorates many foundational and philosophical problems,
but has to be compromised in practice.
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